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In order to decrease the occurrence of social exclusion in adolescence, we need to better understand how adolescents
perceive and behave toward peers involved in exclusion. We examined the role of friendships in treatment of perpetra-
tors and victims of social exclusion. Eighty-nine participants (aged 9–16) observed exclusion of an unfamiliar peer (vic-
tim) by their best friend and another unfamiliar peer. Subsequently, participants could give up valuable coins to
altruistically punish or help peers. Results showed that participants altruistically compensated victims and punished
unfamiliar excluders, but refrained from punishing their friends. Our findings show that friendship with excluders
modulates altruistic punishment of peers and provide mechanistic insight into how friendships may influence treat-
ment of peers involved in social exclusion during adolescence.
One of the prime human needs is the need to
belong, characterized by the tendency to seek out,
form, and maintain strong relationships with others
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Social rejection, which
thwarts this fundamental need to belong, is a com-
mon threat, ranging from a prevalence of 15% to
50% across countries (Molcho et al., 2009; Wang,
Iannotti, & Nansel, 2009). Two often identified
forms of social rejection are bullying (characterized
by an excessive amount of negative attention given
to a victim, for instance in the form of hitting or
name calling) and social exclusion (characterized
by a complete absence of attention given to a vic-
tim, for instance by ignoring, or not allowing to
join in play). Both forms of social rejection have
extensive negative consequences for the victim,
where victimization has been linked to negative
health outcomes (Giletta et al., 2017) and a
decreased sense of well-being (Gorrese & Ruggieri,
2012; Juvonen, Nishina, & Graham, 2000; O’Brien
& Bierman, 1988; for a review on the effects of
social exclusion, see Williams, 2007; for a review
on the effects of bullying, see Wolke & Lereya,
2015).
Prevention of bullying and social exclusion in
adolescence is an important issue, considering the
high prevalence of social exclusion during child-
hood and adolescence (Craig & Harel, 2004; Jansen
et al., 2012; Molcho et al., 2009) and negative con-
sequences of social exclusion for victims (Isaacs,
Hodges, & Salmivalli, 2008), witnesses (Nishina &
Juvonen, 2005), and bullies (Nansel, Craig, Over-
peck, Saluja, & Ruan, 2004). Moreover, the majority
of social exclusion takes place in the presence of
peers (Atlas & Pepler, 1998). Research has indi-
cated that besides the perpetrator and the victim,
the larger peer group is often involved in bullying
or social exclusion incidents (Salmivalli, 2010).
Peers involved in social exclusion can often be clas-
sified by different participant roles such as assis-
tants of excluders, reinforcers of excluders,
outsiders, and defenders of victims (Salmivalli,
Lagerspetz, Bj€orkqvist, €Osterman, & Kaukiainen,
1996). Perceptions of the peer group about bullying
and exclusion affect the frequency of these
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behaviors. For instance, increased support and
reinforcement of bullies increase bullying in the
peer group, whereas higher levels of support for
the victim decrease bullying (Faris & Ennett, 2012;
Salmivalli, Voeten, & Poskiparta, 2011). In a similar
vein, a recent large-scale field study showed that
interventions aimed at changing perceptions in the
peer group can effectively reduce overall levels of
conflict in schools (Paluck, Shepherd, & Aronow,
2016). One of the key motivations behind bullying
is a possible increase in status for the bullies (Car-
avita & Cillessen, 2012; Juvonen & Galvan, 2008;
Pellegrini & Long, 2002; Pouwels et al., 2017;
Salmivalli & Peets, 2009; Sijtsema, Veenstra, Lin-
denberg, & Salmivalli, 2009). Considering the key
role peers have in stopping or maintaining bully-
ing, a bully’s pursuit of status in the peer group
may be more successful in peer groups with more
positive perceptions of bullies. Moreover, friend-
ship with the perpetrators of social exclusion (i.e.,
the excluders) might influence the degree to which
excluders are supported or punished in real-life
social exclusion situations. Such support or punish-
ment behavior is likely to determine whether or
not social exclusion perseveres over time.
Over the last decade, a large number of experi-
mental studies have examined social exclusion using
the experimental paradigm Cyberball, a virtual ball-
tossing game in which one player is typically
excluded by two other players (Williams, Cheung, &
Choi, 2000). In these studies, Cyberball has been
shown to have robust negative effects on mood and
need satisfaction of victims of exclusion across the
lifespan (Lustenberger & Jagacinski, 2010; Williams,
2007; for a recent meta-analysis of Cyberball studies,
see Hartgerink, Van Beest, Wicherts, & Williams,
2015). In addition, it has been shown that merely
observing social exclusion is associated with similar
negative consequences on mood (Beeney, Franklin,
Levy, & Adams, 2011; Nishina & Juvonen, 2005;
Wesselmann, Bagg, & Williams, 2009), which holds
across a broad age range between 9 and 22 (Will,
Crone, Van den Bos, & G€uroglu, 2013).
Recently, several studies have experimentally
examined the behavioral consequences of exclusion
on subsequent social interactions using monetary
allocation games that aimed to investigate behavior
after exclusion. In such allocation games partici-
pants typically divide valuable units (e.g., coins)
between themselves and at least one other player.
These games are highly suitable and efficient in
assessing punishment and compensation behavior
under different conditions (Will & G€uroglu, 2016).
Findings show that victims of exclusion typically
punish bullies (i.e., initiators of social exclusion)
(Gunther Moor et al., 2012), even when punish-
ment is costly (Will, Crone, & G€uroglu, 2015). A
similar effect on punishment of bullies has also
been shown in experiments of observed exclusion:
individuals who observe social exclusion of others
tend to punish the bullies, also referred to as
“third-party punishment.” Furthermore, they also
help victims of exclusion when it is costly (Will
et al., 2013) or show prosocial behavior toward the
victims in the form of helping and comforting
(Masten, Eisenberger, Pfeifer, & Dapretto, 2010). A
developmental study has further shown that pun-
ishment of bullies and compensation of victims
increases with age across adolescence and is
related to the developing ability to take another
person’s perspective (Will et al., 2013).
The majority of studies on effects of being
excluded or observing exclusion has examined
interactions with unfamiliar others. Given the high
impact of different roles of peers in social exclusion
situations (Salmivalli, 2010), it is highly likely that
existing relationships (such as friendships) with
excluders and victims will influence how peers wit-
nessing exclusion will treat these excluders and
victims. For example, a positive relationship with a
bully might lead a witness to turn a blind eye. One
study in young adults showed that participants
punished unfamiliar excluders more than they did
familiar excluders (i.e., classmates), especially when
they liked the familiar excluder more than they
liked the victim (G€urogˇlu, Will, & Klapwijk, 2013).
This finding shows that existing peer relationships
in adults influence how individuals treat excluders
and victims upon witnessing social exclusion.
However, it is unknown how differential treatment
of excluders depending on existing friendships
develops across adolescence, which is a develop-
mental period during which friendships are known
to become increasingly important for well-being
(Berndt, 1992; Larson & Richards, 1991; Larson,
Richards, Moneta, Holmbeck, & Duckett, 1996).
The goal of this study was to fill this gap in the lit-
erature by investigating how friendship modulates
behavioral responses to social exclusion across late
childhood and adolescence. We specifically exam-
ined how witnesses of social exclusion treat perpe-
trators depending on whether the perpetrator is
their friend or an unknown peer.
Children and adolescents (aged 9–16) were
invited to the current study with their best friend
and first played one round of Cyberball and subse-
quently observed two rounds of Cyberball (see Fig-
ure 1 for an overview of the experimental
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procedure). All Cyberball rounds involved other
players who were unfamiliar to the participants,
except for their best friend who was depicted as an
excluder (i.e., bully) in the third Cyberball round.
Using one-shot monetary allocation games in
between the Cyberball rounds, we examined how
participants treated peers with different roles in
social exclusion (i.e., includers, excluders, and vic-
tims). In order to investigate both non-costly and
costly punishment, we included two different allo-
cation games (games in which participants divide
valuable units between themselves and another
player), namely, the Dictator Game to assess non-
costly punishment and the Altruistic Punishment/
Compensation Game to assess costly punishment.
Of specific interest was the third round of Cyber-
ball, in which we examined treatment of an unfa-
miliar victim, an unfamiliar excluder, and an
excluder who was the participant’s best friend.
Based on prior findings, we expected participants
to show decreases in mood upon observing exclu-
sion (Wesselmann, Williams, & Hales, 2013). In line
with previous studies, we also expected partici-
pants to punish perpetrators of social exclusion
and compensate victims by allocating more coins
to them (Will et al., 2013). We further hypothesized
that there would be an age-related increase in both
punishment and compensation behavior based on
findings showing that with increasing age adoles-
cents get consistently better at integrating informa-
tion about the social context (G€uroglu, van den
Bos, & Crone, 2014; Overgaauw, G€uroglu, & Crone,
2012), interaction partners (G€uroglu, van den Bos,
van Dijk, Rombouts, & Crone, 2011; Overgaauw
et al., 2012), and their intentions (G€uroglu, van den
Bos, & Crone, 2009) when making decisions. This
age-related increase in punishment behavior was
expected for the unfamiliar excluder.
Furthermore, we expected a contextual influ-
ence, reflected in differential treatment of excluders
such that participants would punish unfamiliar
excluders more severely than excluders who are
their friends (G€uroǧlu et al., 2013). Since literature
points to early- to mid-adolescence as a period of
increased sensitivity for the peer group and friend-
ships (Braams, van Leijenhorst, & Crone, 2014;
Knoll, Leung, Foulkes, & Blakemore, 2017; Knoll,
Magis-Weinberg, Speekenbrink, & Blakemore, 2015;
Van Hoorn, Van Dijk, G€uroglu, & Crone, 2016), we
hypothesized that early and mid-adolescents would
differentiate between unfamiliar and friend exclud-
ers by punishing friends less than unfamiliar
excluders, whereas preadolescents would treat
friend and unfamiliar excluders in similar ways.
METHODS
Participants and Procedure
Eighty-nine participants from three age groups
were recruited through advertisements and media.
The sample included 23 9–11-year-olds
(Mage = 10.45, SDage = 1.41, 12 girls), 34 12–13-year-
olds (Mage = 12.47, SDage = 0.10, 16 girls), and 32
15–16-year-olds (Mage = 15.91 years, SDage = 0.82,
16 girls). There were no differences in gender dis-
tribution between the three groups, v2(2) = .29,
p = .86. Four participants were excluded from the
analyses. One participant was excluded because he
gave the same response to all Likert scale items,
one did not complete the experiment, and two
others explicitly indicated their disbelief in the
cover story to the experimenter after the Cyberball
sessions.
All participants arrived in the laboratory
together with their best friend. At the start of each
session, participants were gathered in a room with
their friends and six age-matched confederates.
Confederates were recruited from local theatre
schools and were all instructed extensively prior to
the data collection session. The confederates intro-
duced themselves by saying their name and shak-
ing hands with the participant and their best
friend. Participants were informed that they would
be taking part in a study where they would engage
in online interactions with one another (i.e., with
their friends and the confederates). They were told
that they would all be taken to separate testing
rooms. After this brief introduction, participants
remained in the room; their best friend and the
confederates were taken to separate testing rooms,
upon which the confederates in fact left. The par-
ticipants did not see the confederates again after
this point and they did not see their friend until
after they completed the study. Unbeknownst to
the participants, their friends took part in a differ-
ent study that is reported elsewhere (Van Hoorn
et al., 2016).
Participants started the experimental session by
playing the Dictator Game, a monetary allocation
game in which participants have full control over
the division of valuable units between themselves
and the other player. In the first round of the Dic-
tator Game, participants were asked to distribute
10 valuable coins between themselves and every
other player in subsequent one-shot trials. The
game consisted of a total of eight divisions that
served as a baseline measure of their allocation
behavior toward the other players (i.e., their friend
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and the confederates). Then, participants played
one round of online Cyberball, and subsequently
observed two rounds of online Cyberball games. In
between each round participants (1) reported their
own mood and estimates of the other players’
mood and (2) played another Dictator Game where
they could distribute coins between themselves
and players from the prior Cyberball round. After
each of the observed Cyberball rounds, participants
also played an Altruistic Punishment/Compensa-
tion Game, where they could choose to give up
valuable coins to punish a player (i.e., by decreas-
ing the other person’s coins) or compensate a
player (i.e., by increasing the other person’s coins).
See Figure 1 for an overview of this experimental
session involving the Cyberball and the allocation
games. After this experimental session, participants
filled out several questionnaires on the computer.
In the final questionnaire, we evaluated belief in
the cover story based on two open-ended questions
without directly posing the question whether par-
ticipants believed in it: “What was it like to play
the ball game with other players over the inter-
net?” and “What was it like to observe the others
play the ball game?” No participants were
excluded from the analyses due to their answers to
these two questions. Two participants indicated
after the full experiment that they did not believe
the cover story and were excluded from analyses.
The complete session lasted for about 45 min in
total. Informed consent was obtained from the par-
ticipants and the parents of participants younger
than 16 years old. The local institutional ethics
review board approved of all procedures. At the
end of each session, participants were debriefed
fully and all participants received a monetary
compensation of 20 euros for their participa-
tionplus their earnings from the allocation games
(see below for more information).
Materials
Cyberball. All participants played one round
and observed two rounds of the virtual ball-tossing
game Cyberball in a predetermined order (Wil-
liams et al., 2000). Unbeknownst to the participant,
the throws of the other two players were prepro-
grammed. The instructions emphasized that there
would be new players in each round; participants
were able to see the names of the other players on
the screen, displayed above the avatars of each
respective player. During the first ball-tossing
round (hereafter referred to as “inclusion”), partici-
pants were included by the two other players (i.e.,
confederate 1–2). The “inclusion” round was pro-
grammed so that each player received the ball 10
times (out of 30 passes in total). During the second
and third rounds of Cyberball, participants
observed the exclusion of an unfamiliar peer.
Unbeknownst to the participant, these players were
in fact confederates of the study. In the second
round (hereafter “observed inclusion”), an unfamil-
iar peer was excluded by two unfamiliar excluders
(i.e., confederates 3–5). In the third round, a novel
unfamiliar peer (i.e., confederate 7) was excluded
by a novel unfamiliar peer (i.e., confederate 6) and
the participants’ best friend. To control for possible
effects of gender, we ensured that all players in the
exclusion round were of the same gender as the
participant. The “exclusion” round was prepro-
grammed such that one of the three players (con-
federate 7) received the ball only once at the start
FIGURE 1 Experimental procedure where the participants (1) first rated their own mood and played the Dictator Game (DG) for all
confederates (1–7) and their friend, then participated in (2) a Cyberball inclusion game with two confederates (confederate 1 and 2),
followed by a second round of self-mood ratings, mood estimations of other players and the Dictator Game for confederates 1 and 2.
Then, (3) participants observed Cyberball inclusion of three confederates (confederates 3–5), followed by rating their mood, their inten-
tions to punish/help these players, by estimating the mood of the other players, and by playing the Dictator Game and the Altruistic
Punishment/Compensation Game (APCG) for them. Next, (4) participants observed their best friend and a confederate (confederate 6)
exclude a third confederate (the victim, confederate 7), followed again by rating their mood and their intentions to punish/help these
players, by estimating the mood of other players and by playing the Dictator Game and Altruistic Punishment/Compensation Game
for them. Finally, at the end of the experimental session, (5) participants filled out several exit questionnaires.
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of the game and did not receive the ball for the
remaining of the round (Williams, 2007). For the
remainder of the 29 throws, the other players solely
passed to each other.
To keep participants engaged in the task during
the observed Cyberball rounds they were asked to
keep track of how many times every player
received the ball and report this on paper. Partici-
pants were told that all Cyberball sessions were
online such that all players would watch the ball-
tossing games and that all players knew that they
would be watched during these games.
Mood. Participants rated their own mood at
four different moments throughout the experiment:
(1) before and (2) after the inclusion, (3) after
observed inclusion and (4) after observed exclu-
sion. Additionally, participants were asked to esti-
mate the mood of a randomly chosen player in the
observed inclusion round and estimate the mood
of all three players from the observed exclusion
round. The mood assessments were based on three
items for the youngest participants (feeling happy,
sad, and angry); for the older two age groups there
was an additional fourth item (feeling good). All
items were scored on a 7-point scale; scores were
averaged where higher scores indicated better
mood (‘sad’ and ‘angry’ were recoded before aver-
aging).
Intentions to punish and help. After the
observed inclusion Cyberball round, participants
were asked to indicate, on a 7-point scale ranging
from 1 (fully disagree) to 7 (fully agree) to what
extent they intended to punish or to help one ran-
domly chosen player of the previous round. They
were asked to do the same after the observed
exclusion Cyberball round for each of the three
players in that round. Higher scores indicate
higher intention to punish or help the other player.
Allocation games. At the start of the experi-
mental session, before Cyberball, participants
played one allocation round for all players that
they had met and for their friend. This was used as
a baseline measure of their allocation behavior
toward specific players. In addition, after each con-
secutive Cyberball round, participants played two
sets of allocation games in which they could dis-
tribute valuable coins between themselves and the
players from the previous Cyberball round. It was
explained that these allocation games were offline
such that no one else could see their decisions. It
was also explained that the coins they distributed
in the games would be converted to money and
that their decisions in these games would be
anonymously added to their final earnings as well
as those of the other players. In the end, all partici-
pants received the same amount of money for these
games (€2,-). Participants played these allocation
games with one randomly chosen player after the
inclusion and observed inclusion rounds because
players during the inclusion round were indistin-
guishable (i.e., they were all confederates that the
participant had just met and showed the same
behavior during Cyberball). After the observed
exclusion round, the participants played the alloca-
tion games with each of the three players from that
round.
Dictator Game. In the Dictator Game, the partic-
ipants were asked to divide 10 coins between
themselves and the other player. They could
choose from seven fixed divisions. These divisions
were depicted by numbers on the computer screen
from left to right with the 5/5 option in the middle
of the screen. Participants could select a division
by clicking on the bullet point below their division
of choice (see Figure 2). The number of coins allo-
cated to the other player was used in the analyses.
Altruistic Punishment/Compensation Game. After
every Dictator Game following observed Cyberball
rounds, participants played the Altruistic Punish-
ment/Compensation Game, a costly allocation
game in which the choice architecture was designed
so that the opposite sides of the scale represented
costly punishment and costly compensation (i.e.,
helping) and the middle point represented an
equity option (see Figure 3). In other words, partici-
pants could choose to stick to the equity distribu-
tion of 10 coins for self and 10 coins for other or to
deviate from the equity distribution by paying coins
to either increase (i.e., costly compensation) or
decrease (i.e., costly punishment) the payoff of the
other player (G€urogˇlu et al., 2013; Leliveld, Van
Dijk, & Van Beest, 2012; Will et al., 2013). The num-
ber of coins allocated to the other player was used
in the analyses; this number could thus range
between 1 and 19. Importantly, allocating 10 points
to the other player indicates an equal distribution
entailing no costs to the participant.
Statistical Analyses
To test our hypotheses, we performed a series of
within-subjects analyses. First, we conducted two
repeated measures (RM) analyses of variance
(ANOVAs) to examine whether the various Cyber-
ball sessions influenced self-mood ratings and
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other-mood estimations for different players (unfa-
miliar excluder, friend excluder, and victim) over
time. Next, to examine participants’ motivations to
compensate and punish other players after inclu-
sion-observation and exclusion-observation Cyber-
ball, we conducted two RM ANOVAs on intentions
to punish and help for the different players (unfa-
miliar includer, unfamiliar excluder, victim, and
friend excluder). Finally, to examine the influence
of various Cyberball sessions on punishment and
compensation behavior, we conducted two RM
ANOVAs to, respectively, compare the Dictator
Game and the Altruistic Punishment/Compensa-
tion Game allocations made for the four different
players (Unfamiliar Includer, Unfamiliar Excluder,
Victim, and Friend Excluder). In the Dictator
Game, we compared allocations for each player
with the baseline Dictator Game allocations before
the Cyberball session. In the Punishment/Compen-
sation game, we also conducted separate paired-
sample t-tests to examine whether the allocations
for the four players deviated from an allocation of
10 coins in the equity option. We also examined
correlations between intentions to punish and help
and allocation behavior. In all our analyses, we cor-
rected for multiple comparisons and reported Bon-
ferroni-corrected results (with alphas adjusted
based on the number of comparisons for each
respective analysis).
RESULTS
Manipulation Check
As an index of attentiveness, we compared tallies
kept by participants to the actual throws made.
This comparison showed that almost all partici-
pants counted the number of throws correctly and
were paying attention to the Cyberball game. Two
participants counted 20 balls thrown to all partici-
pating players (instead of the correct 10) in the
observed inclusion round but still had an accurate
tally in the observed exclusion round. Because of
the accurate tally in the exclusion round, these par-
ticipants were not excluded from the analyses.
There were no significant differences between age
groups for any of the tallies kept during the inclu-
sion or exclusion Cyberball games (all p > .15),
indicating that there was no age difference in the
amount of attention paid during the Cyberball
games. For all the results reported here, we used
Greenhouse-Geisser corrections when the assump-
tion of sphericity was violated.
Mood
In order to investigate changes in mood, we con-
ducted a RM ANOVA with Time (four levels: Base-
line, Inclusion, Observed inclusion, and Observed
Exclusion) as the within-subjects factor and Age
Group (three levels: 9–11-year-olds, 12–13-year-
olds, and 15–16-year-olds) as the between-subjects
factor. Figure 4a displays means for self-mood
ratings. There was a significant main effect of
Time, F(2.03, 166.17) = 10.20, p < .001, g² = .157.
The main effect of Age Group was not significant,
F(2, 82) = 2.90, p = .060, g² = .066. The interaction
between Time and Age group was not significant,
F(4.05, 166.17) = 2.39, p = .051, g² = .055. Pairwise
comparisons (corrected for five comparisons;
a = .01) showed that mood ratings were signifi-
cantly higher after Inclusion Play (M = 6.46) than
FIGURE 2 Depiction of onscreen possible coin division in the Dictator Game. From left to right: 10 coins for the other player, 0 for
themselves (0/10); 8 for the other player, 2 for themselves (2/8); 6 for the other player, 4 for themselves (4/6); 5 for the other player, 5
for themselves (5/5); 4 for the other player, 6 for themselves (6/4); 2 for the other player, 8 for themselves (8/2); or 0 for the other
player, 10 for themselves (10/0).
FIGURE 3 Depiction of onscreen possible coin division in the Altruistic Punishment/Compensation Game. From left to right: 7
coins for themselves, 19 for the other player (7/19); 8 coins for themselves, 16 for the other player (8/16); 9 coins for themselves, 13
for the other player (9/13); 10 coins for both themselves and the other player (10/10); 9 coins for themselves and 7 for the other player
(9/7); 8 coins for themselves and 4 for the other player (8/4); or 7 for themselves and 1 for the other player (7/1).
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at baseline (M = 6.26; t(85) = 2.73, p < .014,
g² = .021). Mood ratings did not differ significantly
between Inclusion Play and Observed Inclusion
(M = 6.54; t(85) = 0.68, p = .167). Most importantly,
mood ratings were significantly lower after
Observed Exclusion (M = 5.93) than after baseline
(M = 6.260, t(85) = 2.862, p = .006, g² = .10) and
after Observed Inclusion (M = 6.54; t(85) = 4.79,
p < .001, g² = .06).
Estimates of Others’ Mood
A RM ANOVA was conducted with Player (three
levels: Unfamiliar Excluder, Friend Excluder, and
Victim) as the within-subjects factor and Age
Group (three levels: 9–11-year-olds, 12–13-year-
olds, and 15–16-year-olds) as the between-subjects
factor to examine estimates of others’ mood after
observed Exclusion Cyberball (Figure 4b). There
was a main effect of Player on mood ratings, F
(1.34, 110.15) = 349.32, p < .001, g2 = .81, indicating
that participants rated the moods of players differ-
ently. The main effect of Age Group (F(2,
83) = 0.0003, p = 1) and the interaction between
Player and Age Group were not significant, F(2.68,
110.15) = 1.87, p = .028.
Pairwise comparisons (corrected for five compar-
isons; a = .01) indicated that (1) there were no dif-
ferences in mood ratings for the Unfamiliar
Excluder (M = 6.57) and the Friend Excluder
(M = 6.69; t(85) = 1.39, p = .17) and (2) mood rat-
ings for the victim (M = 3.06) were significantly
lower than for both the Friend Excluder (M = 6.69;
t(85) = 21.43 p < .001, g2 = .57) and the Unfamiliar
Excluder (t(85) = 19.24, p < .001, g2 = .52).
Intentions to Punish and Help
To investigate whether there were differences in
intentions to punish and help excluders and vic-
tims, we conducted two RM ANOVAs with Player
(four levels: Unfamiliar Includer, Unfamiliar Exclu-
der, Friend Excluder, and Victim) as within-sub-
jects factor and Age Group (three levels: 9–11-year-
olds, 12–13-year-olds, and 15–16-year- olds) as
between-subjects factor (see Figure 5a,b).
There was a significant main effect of Player,
F(1.74, 143.38) = 76.17, p < .001, g² = .482, on inten-
tion to punish. The interaction between Player and
Age Group was not significant, F(3.49,
143.38) = 0.69, p = .58. Post hoc comparisons (cor-
rected for seven comparisons; a = .007) revealed
that (1) participants intended to punish the unfa-
miliar excluder (M = 3.40) more than the friend
excluder (M = 2.85) and (2) participants intended
to punish the friend excluder more (M = 2.85) than
the victim (M = 1.09) and the unfamiliar includer
(M = 1.31) (all p-values < .001).
With respect to intentions to help, there was a
significant main effect of Player, F(2.245,
183.92) = 92.84, p < .001, g2 = .53, and Age Group,
F(2, 83) = 5.519, p = .006, g² = .12. The
Player 9 Age Group interaction was not significant
(p = .076). Pairwise comparisons (corrected for
seven comparisons; a = .007) showed that partici-
pants intended to help the unfamiliar excluder less
(M = 1.78) than the friend excluder (M = 2.51;
t(84) = 3.91, p < .001, g² = .04) and the unfamiliar
includer (M = 2.58; t(84) = 5,42, p < .001, g² = .08)
and indicated to want to help the victim (M = 5.36)
more than the friend excluder (t(84) = 9.55,
p < .001, g² = .21) and the unfamiliar includer
FIGURE 4 (a) Average self-mood ratings at baseline (before Cyberball), and after playing inclusion, observing inclusion, and observ-
ing exclusion Cyberball rounds. Error bars display 95% confidence intervals (CI) of the standard error. (b) Average other-mood ratings
after Cyberball observed exclusion for the unfamiliar excluder, friend excluder, and victim. Error bars display 95% CI of the standard
error.
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(t(84) = 11.84, p < .001, g² = .28). Post hoc tests
revealed that 9–11-year-olds (M = 3.70) had signifi-
cantly higher intentions to help than 12–13-year-
olds (M = 2.76; t(84) = 3.18, p = .007), and that
9–11-year-olds did not significantly differ from
15–16-year-olds (M = 2.93; t(84) = 2.37, p = .020),
nor did 12–13-year-olds (M = 2.76) from 15–16-
year-olds (M = 2.93; t(84) = 0.87, p = 1).
Punishment of Excluders and Compensation of
Victims After Observed Exclusion
Dictator Game. In order to investigate punish-
ment and compensation of excluders and victims
after observed exclusion, we examined changes in
Dictator Game allocations after observed exclusion
toward the four players (unfamiliar includer, unfa-
miliar excluder, friend excluder, and victim) rela-
tive to baseline Dictator Game allocations. Points
allocated to the other players in the Dictator Game
at baseline (before Cyberball) were averaged across
unfamiliar includers. Specifically, we conducted a
RM ANOVA with Round (two levels: baseline and
after Cyberball) and Player (four levels: Unfamiliar
Includer, Unfamiliar Excluder, Friend Excluder,
and Victim) as within-subjects factors and Age
Group (three levels: 9–11-year-olds, 12–13-year-
olds, and 15–16-year-olds) as between-subjects fac-
tor for the Dictator Game (see Figure 6a).
Results yielded a main effect of Player, F(2.34,
192.24) = 23.28, p < .001, g² = .22. There was no
main effect of Age Group, F(2, 82) = 0.87, p = .422,
or Round, F(1, 82) = 1.22, p = .27. The
Player 9 Age Group interaction was not signifi-
cant, F(4.69, 192.24) = 1.77, p = .12). The
Round 9 Player interaction was significant, F(2.12,
174.18) = 17.86, p < .001, g² = .18. Pairwise compar-
isons (corrected for six comparisons; a = .00833)
showed that, on average, participants gave (1)
fewer coins (all ps < .001) to unfamiliar excluders
(M = 2.66, SD = 1.84) compared to unfamiliar
includers (M = 4.01, SD = 1.88), (2) fewer coins to
unfamiliar includers (M = 4.01, SD = 1.88) than to
friend excluders (M = 4.53, SD = 2.20), and (3) an
equal number of coins to friend excluders and vic-
tims (M = 4.89, SD = 2.46).
To investigate the interaction effect between
Round and Player in more detail, we conducted
four separate RM ANOVAs (one for each player;
corrected for four comparisons; a = .0125) with
Round (two levels: baseline and after Cyberball) as
factor. These analyses showed that in comparison
to baseline distributions, the number of coins given
after Cyberball (1) to unfamiliar excluders
decreased, F(1, 82) = 43.60, p < .001, g² = .35, (2) to
the victim increased, F(1, 82) = 8.55, p < .001,
g² = .09, and (3) did not change for friend exclud-
ers, F(1, 82) = 1.67, p = .20, and unfamiliar includ-
ers, F(1, 82) = 0.68, p = .41.
Altruistic Punishment/Compensation Game. To
investigate punishment and helping behavior in
FIGURE 5 (a) Intentions to punish the unfamiliar excluder, friend excluder and the victim following Cyberball observed exclusion
for 9–11-year-olds, 12–13-year-olds, and 15–16-year-olds. Error bars display 95% CI of the standard error. (b) Intentions to help the
unfamiliar excluder, friend excluder, and the victim following Cyberball observed exclusion for 9–11-year-olds, 12–13-year-olds, and
15–16-year-olds. Error bars display 95% CI of the standard error.
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the Altruistic Punishment/Compensation Game,
we conducted a RM ANOVA with Player (four
levels: unfamiliar includer, unfamiliar excluder,
friend excluder, and victim) as within-subjects fac-
tor and Age Group (three levels: 9–11-year-olds,
12–13-year-olds, and 15–16-year-olds) as between-
subjects factor (See Figure 6b).
Results showed a main effect of Player, F(2.26,
185.44) = 23.81, p < .001, g² = .23; the Age Group
main effect and Player 9 Age Group interaction
were not significant, F(2, 82) = 1.83, p = .17 and F
(4.23, 185.43) = 2.19, p = .064, respectively. Post hoc
paired-sample t-tests (corrected for three compar-
isons; a = .016) showed that participants gave (1)
fewer coins to unfamiliar excluders (M = 7.21) than
to unfamiliar includers (M = 9.72; t(84) = 6.10,
p < .001, g² = .09), (2) fewer coins to unfamiliar
includers (M = 9.72) than to victims (M = 10.92;
t(84) = 3.67, p < .001, g² = .03), and (3) an equal
number of coins to friend excluders (M = 10.35)
and victims (M = 10.92; t(84) = 0.97, p = .33).
Next, to be able to draw conclusions about
actual punishment and compensation behavior
(helping), we compared numbers of coins given to
players with the number of coins in the equity
option (i.e., 10 coins for other) as a measure of
deviations from the equity option. We conducted a
series of t-tests per player (unfamiliar includer,
unfamiliar excluder, friend excluder and victim;
corrected for four comparisons; a = .0125) where
we compared the number of coins given to players
to the set value of 10. Results yielded significant
differences from the equity option for two of the
four players: unfamiliar includers (M = 9.72) were
neither punished nor helped (t(84) = 0.97, p = .34,
g2 = .84), unfamiliar excluders (M = 7.21) were
punished (t(84) = 8.48, p < .001, g2 = .59), friend
excluders (M = 10.35) were neither punished nor
helped (t(84) = 0.83, p = .41) and victims
(M = 10.92) were helped (t(84) = 2.82, p < .001,
g2 = .76).
Relation Intentions and Actual Helping and
Punishment Behavior
To investigate whether participants followed up on
intentions to help or punish players, we examined
the correlations between intentions to help or pun-
ish and actual behavior in the Altruistic Punish-
ment/Compensation Game. We did not look at the
Dictator Game allocations because giving less coins
to the other is not costly to the participant in the
Dictator Game (whereas helping is). In the Altruis-
tic Punishment/Compensation Game, both helping
and punishment are costly.
All intentions to punish a player and the respec-
tive number of coins allocated were significantly
negatively correlated (for victim r(85) = .26, unfa-
miliar excluder r(85) = .35, friend excluder
r(85) = .31; all p < .05), indicating that the more
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FIGURE 6 (a) Number of coins allocated in Dictator Game at baseline (before Cyberball interactions) and following Cyberball exclu-
sion observation to unfamiliar excluder, friend excluder, and victim. Error bars display 95% CI of the standard error of the mean. A
division of five coins represents the equity option. (b) Number of coins allocated in Altruistic Punishment/Compensation Game to
unfamiliar includer (following Cyberball observed inclusion) and to unfamiliar excluder, friend excluder, and victim (following Cyber-
ball observed exclusion). Error bars display 95% CI of the standard error of the mean. A division of 10 coins represents the equity
option.
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participants indicated to want to punish a player,
the less coins they gave them. The intentions to
help and the number of coins given in the Altruis-
tic Punishment/Compensation Game were signifi-
cantly correlated for victims and friends (for victim
r(85) = .24, friend r(85) = .24, both p < .05), but not
for unfamiliar excluders (r(85) = .099, p = .36).
DISCUSSION
This study examined punishment and compensa-
tion after observed exclusion in late childhood and
adolescence in an experimental setting using
Cyberball, with a specific focus on how friendship
with the excluder modulates behavioral responses
to observing social exclusion. We specifically exam-
ined how witnesses of social exclusion treated per-
petrators depending on whether the perpetrator
was their friend or an unknown peer. We repli-
cated earlier findings showing that witnesses of
social exclusion report decreases in mood and sub-
sequently punish excluders and help victims. Our
results extend prior work by showing that altruistic
punishment decisions strongly depend on friend-
ship with the excluder. That is, even though wit-
nesses report equal intentions to punish friend and
unfamiliar excluders, they punish unfamiliar
excluders, while refraining from punishing their
best friend.
Effects of Witnessing Social Exclusion on Self-
and Other-Mood Ratings
We replicated earlier findings of witnessing Cyber-
ball leading to decreased mood ratings (G€urogˇlu
et al., 2013; Wesselmann et al., 2009; Will et al.,
2013). After witnessing social exclusion, we found
no age differences in self- and other-mood ratings
between the ages of 9 and 16. As expected, partici-
pants of all ages estimated victims to feel worse
than excluders. These results show that partici-
pants aged 9–16 are able to understand the emo-
tional consequences of social exclusion for the
victim. Although previous studies have examined
mood estimations of victims (Will et al., 2015), to
the best of our knowledge, no studies have investi-
gated mood estimations of excluders. We found
that friend excluders and unfamiliar excluders
were estimated to have similar levels of mood.
Interestingly however, all participants estimated
high (positive) mood for excluders, showing that
individuals do not estimate bullies to feel particu-
larly bad.
Effects of Witnessing Social Exclusion on
Intentions to Help and Punish
Participants aged 9–16 intended to punish unfamil-
iar excluders more than friend excluders, and both
unfamiliar and friend excluders more than the vic-
tim. The reverse was true for intentions to help. All
participants intended to help the victim more than
the excluders and to help the friend excluder more
than the unfamiliar excluder. Thus, the relationship
the witness has with the excluder influences their
intentions to punish or help. These results indicate
that participants intended to treat their friend more
positively than an unfamiliar excluder despite their
identical norm-violating behavior.
The youngest participants had slightly higher
intentions to help other players than the older par-
ticipants. Potentially, indicating to help others
might be seen more as a social norm among
younger participants, whereas older participants
are more likely to make helping judgments based
on individual behavior and merit (G€uroglu et al.,
2014). It has been shown that with age, adolescents
move away from strictly egalitarian views and
increasingly base their fairness judgments on indi-
vidual achievements and circumstances (Almas,
Cappelen, Sorensen, & Tungodden, 2010; Meuwese,
Crone, de Rooij, & G€uroglu, 2015).
Effects of Witnessing Social Exclusion on
Subsequent Treatment of Excluders and Victims
By comparing changes in Dictator Game allocations
after Cyberball to allocations at baseline (which
were made before any Cyberball interactions), we
showed that (1) includers and friend excluders
were treated the same before and after Cyberball,
(2) victims received more coins after being
excluded than at baseline (and were thus helped),
and (3) unfamiliar excluders were given less coins
after excluding than at baseline (and were thus
punished). As such, although participants of all
ages indicated that they wanted to punish both
friend excluders as well as unfamiliar excluders,
unfamiliar excluders were actually punished for
their norm-violating behavior but friend excluders
were not. This punishment of unfamiliar excluders
was in line with previously reported intentions,
but participants treated friend excluders as if noth-
ing had happened and gave them same amount of
coins as at baseline.
This pattern of findings was replicated using the
Altruistic Punishment/Compensation Game. In
contrast to the Dictator Game, no baseline
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measures are needed in the Altruistic Punishment/
Compensation Game as each option represents
punishment or compensation. Nonetheless, it has
been shown in previous studies (Gunther Moor
et al., 2012; Will et al., 2013) that increases and
decreases in generosity in the Dictator Game reflect
punishment and compensation. In the Altruistic
Punishment/Compensation Game, participants
could choose an equal distribution without incur-
ring any costs to themselves and act in line with
the “fairness” norm. Because deviations from this
equal distribution were costly, they can be used as
an index of costly punishment and compensation
behavior. Our results showed that participants
incurred costs to punish unfamiliar excluders and
to help victims, just as they intended. However,
friend excluders were not punished: they typically
received an equal distribution of coins. In other
words, despite indications of wanting to punish
friends, participants were again not willing to incur
costs to do so. It should be noted that, although the
behavioral patterns in the two games seem similar,
the two games differ in terms of costs of making
equal distributions. In the Dictator Game, partici-
pants actually incur costs to ensure an equal distri-
bution of coins for the victims and friend
excluders, whereas in the Altruistic Punishment/
Compensation Game participants do not seem to
be willing to incur extra costs if they can ensure
the equal coin allocation with no costs attached.
Together, these results show that both when pun-
ishment is costly or non-costly, children and ado-
lescents punish unfamiliar excluders while
refraining from punishing their best friend after
excluding a peer.
Prosocial treatment of friends, regardless of their
prior norm-violating behavior, underlines the value
of friendship in childhood and adolescence. Even
though a friend might act as a bully toward others,
such behavior might often not lead to differential
treatment. The underlying processes might par-
tially be explained by fundamental attribution
biases (Ross, 1977). Speculatively, thoughts and
knowledge about the motivations of the other play-
ers might modulate to what extent individuals
show actual punishment or compensation behavior.
It could be that participants more readily justified
the excluding behavior of their friends while being
less forgiving of unfamiliar excluders. As attribu-
tions of causality to external factors rather than
internal factors take away part of the perceived
responsibility of the excluder, witnesses might feel
that their friend does not need punishment,
whereas the unfamiliar excluder does.
An important note regarding the role of friend-
ship in our results is that we cannot exclude the
possibility that differential treatment toward friend
excluders and unfamiliar excluders is confounded
by familiarity with the friend. That is, we cannot
rule out that similar results can be obtained for dif-
ferential treatment of unfamiliar versus familiar
peers (such as neutral peers from the classroom
who are not friends of the participant). However, it
has previously been shown in adults that the
degree to which observers like excluders and vic-
tims does affect the degree to which they punish
and compensate them (G€urogˇlu et al., 2013), sup-
porting the idea that relationships could play an
important role. Future studies should rule out
these possibly confounding effects of familiarity of
friends by examining the role of different peer rela-
tionships (e.g., best friend/neutral peer/disliked
peer) in adolescent populations.
Absence of Age Differences in Punishment of
Excluders and Compensation of Victims
We found no effects of age on self-mood ratings,
other-mood ratings, and allocations on either the
Dictator Game or the Altruistic Punishment/Com-
pensation Game. In line with previous findings, we
did not expect age differences on mood ratings.
Prior studies have reported similar decreases in
mood across broad age ranges (Abrams, Weick,
Thomas, Colbe, & Franklin, 2011; Saylor et al.,
2013) and our findings confirm these by showing
that participants as young as 9 years old are nega-
tively affected by observations of social exclusion.
However, our findings did not confirm the
expected age differences in subsequent treatment
of excluders and victims. First, we expected to find
an age-related increase in punishment of excluders
(i.e., decreasing number of allocated coins) and in
compensation of victims (i.e., increasing number of
allocated coins) across adolescence. Our findings,
however, show that 9–16-year-olds have similar
fairness considerations (as assessed by the Dictator
Game) and costly punishment and compensation
behavior (as assessed by the Altruistic Punish-
ment/Compensation Game).
Second, whereas we expected the youngest age
groups not to differ in treatment of excluders and
victims, we expected to find a gradual increase in
differentiation between players with increasing
age. Contrary to these expectations, our findings
show that participants as young as 9 years old dif-
ferentiate between individuals with different roles
in social exclusion. Not only did the youngest
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participants differentiate between excluders and
victims, they also differentiated between unfamiliar
and friend excluders and treated unfamiliar
excluders more harshly than friend excluders. In a
previous study, Will et al. (2013) showed that
9-year-olds make similar Dictator Game allocations
for excluders and victims, distributing coins
equally between themselves and the other players,
whereas 11-year-olds differentiated between
excluders and victims. This might be explained by
the difference between the study designs. In the
design by Will et al. (2013), ball-possession in
Cyberball was worth extra participant money such
that the participants could earn money for every
time they received the ball. The introduction of this
economic element made the decision process more
complicated, possibly driving the youngest chil-
dren, who possibly lacked the contextual integra-
tion skills of older children, to make their
allocation decisions based on fairness heuristics
instead of on the contextual information.
In addition, in this study, our youngest age
group covered the age range of 9–11 years, with a
mean age that was closer to 11. It is thus likely that
the ability to incorporate information about others’
behavior into decision making develops indeed
around the age of 11. It is worthwhile for future
studies to focus more on younger age groups to
pinpoint the cognitive abilities that contribute to
this behavioral development. Several prior studies
indicate that perspective-taking skills might con-
tribute to the age-related increases in incorporating
complex forms of contextual information into deci-
sion making (G€uroglu et al., 2009; Will et al., 2013).
Future studies should thus further investigate the
fine-grained cognitive and behavioral changes that
occur across early childhood and adolescence.
IMPLICATIONS
Our findings have implications for interventions to
prevent social exclusion. Specifically, our results
suggest that displays of exclusion behavior of
friends might be perceived less negatively than
those of strangers. While witnesses might punish
excluders in certain situations where the excluder
is unfamiliar to them, they might refrain from
doing so if the excluder is their friend. As such, it
might be useful for future interventions, in addi-
tion to targeting excluders themselves, to specifi-
cally identify and target friends of bullies and
perpetrators of social exclusion. Subsequently, such
interventions can draw more attention to the
friend’s excluding behavior as it might simply be
overlooked by the friend who witnesses. Addition-
ally, interventions may focus on altering percep-
tions of a friend’s excluding behaviors to reduce
the degree to which they condone this behavior
(e.g., by stressing the negative consequences for the
victim). Our results importantly show that friend-
ships with excluders may influence the effective-
ness of interventions aimed at reducing social
exclusion through peer interventions.
CONCLUSIONS: TURNING A BLIND EYE?
This study showed that witnesses of social exclusion
punish excluders less severely when they are friends
with them. Our results show that children and ado-
lescents, like adults (G€urogˇlu et al., 2013), treat
excluders differently when they are friends with
them. The differential treatment of friends and unfa-
miliar excluders was consistent across ages, such
that even 9-year-olds treated friends differently than
unfamiliar excluders. This finding highlights the
developmental significance of friendships and that
the reciprocal norms that come with friendships are
important before entering adolescence (Hartup,
1996; Hay, Payne, & Chadwick, 2004). Based on our
findings, we can hypothesize that one of the reasons
for the lack of involvement of witnessing children
and adolescents in real-life exclusion situations
might be that these witnesses are the excluder’s
friends (Darley & Latane, 1968). Real-life excluders
might often not be punished by friends for their
behavior. To end on a more positive note, unfamiliar
victims were still helped and unfamiliar excluders
were still punished. Even though friend excluders
might not be punished for excluding behavior, wit-
nesses are still willing to incur costs to help victims
and to punish unfamiliar excluders. This is promis-
ing for interventions that aim to reduce bullying and
social exclusion through peer interventions.
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